Multi-issue negotiations present opportunities for tradeoffs that create gains for one or more parties without causing any party to be worse off. The literature suggests that parties are often unable to identity and capitalize on such trades. We present a Negotiation Support System, called NEGOTIATION ASSISTANT, that enables negotiators to analyze their own preferences and provides a structured negotiation process to help parties move toward optimal trades. The underlying model is based on a multi-attribute representation of preferences and communications over a computer network where offers and counter-offers are evaluated according to one's own preferences. The parties can send and receive both formal offers and informal messages. If and when agreement is reached, the computer evaluates the agreement and suggests improvements based on the criteria of Pareto-superiority. In this paper, we motivate the system, present its analytical foundations, discuss its design and development, and provide an assessment of its "value-in-use" based on controlled experiments. Our results strongly suggest that parties using the system in structured negotiation settings would achieve better outcomes than parties negotiating face-to-face or over an e-mail messaging facility, other things being equal. For example, only 4 of the 34 dyads (11.1%) negotiating a simulated sales transaction face-to-face or over e-mail reached an "integrative" settlement, as compared with 29 of the 68 dyads (42
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, there has been increasing interest in the application of computer technologies to problems encountered in negotiations'. Using a variety of modeling approaches and spurred by the demands of real world negotiating environments, the field of Negotiation Support Systems (NSS) is now developing along a number of innovative lines. These range from the design of specialized expert systems that help negotiators prepare for a negotiation, to mediation and interactive negotiation systems that restructure the way negotiations actually take place.
We believe that at least two reasons underlie this growing research interest in computersupported negotiations. First, research consistently suggests that conventional face-to-face negotiation often lead to inefficient outcomes, i.e., settlements that can be improved upon for all parties (e.g., Dwyer and Walker 198 1, Gupta 1989 , Neale and Bazerman 1991 , and Sebenius 1992 . NSS offers the promise of improving negotiation outcomes for the negotiating parties by helping them to prepare for negotiation, and/or by providing a computer-structured mechanism to order the negotiation process. Second, business transactions are increasingly being conducted over computer networks, but without dedicated software support. Securities trading is already computerized, and the use of computers to assist other kinds of traders is spreading rapidly (e.g., Konstadt 1991) . The growth of networked systems such as the Internet, consumer on-line services, and Lotus "Notes" portend greater use of computer-mediated negotiations. NSS can facilitate negotiations in these emerging electronic "bargaining tables" by providing systematic models that structure network negotiations and render them more economically productive. This paper presents an NSS model to facilitate negotiation over computer networks and describes an experiment to investigate whether the use of the system helps parties to locate and execute tradeoffs that maximize the "gains from trade" in multi-issue negotiations. The system, called NEGOTIATION ASSISTANT (hereafter referred to as NA), is based on concepts drawn ' We use the terms negotiation and bargaining interchangeably.
from the emerging field of Negotiation Analysis and provides parties with both preparation tools and an "electronic bargaining table" for two-party, multi-issue negotiations. The contributions of this research are two-fold: From an academic perspective, it provides an analysis of a plausible alternative to a face-to-face negotiation process, a field of increasing interest as evidenced by papers devoted to this topic in the special issue of Management Science . From a practical perspective, it points to the emergence of workable mechanisms to enhance outcomes of business transactions that increasingly are occurring over computer networks.
II. BACKGROUND
A framework for system develonment For computers to add measurable value to the negotiation process, NSS design must be linked to a conceptual framework of negotiation that categorizes various structures under which negotiations take place and stipulates criteria for evaluating outcomes. Walton and Mckersie (1965) make the important distinction between "distributive" bargaining in which parties bargain over a fixed pie, and "integrative" bargaining in which parties may "expand the pie" through identification of differences in priorities and/or compatibility of interests, Research on integrative bargaining suggests that parties negotiating face-to-face often have difficulty in bargaining in ways that permit them to identify and realize integrative tradeoffs. Thus, many negotiations are characterized by sub-optimal tradeoffs, failed communication, and lost opportunities (Pruitt 198 1). The fact that parties "leave money on the table" has led to a search for systematic ways to help parties to achieve more integrative settlements, a search that has given rise to the emerging field of "Negotiation Analysis." Here, we summarize the key precepts of this area. Sebenius (199 1) and Peypon (199 1) provide more comprehensive reviews.
Unlike purely anecdotal approaches to bargaining (e.g., Cohen, 198 l) , Negotiation Analysis uses formalisms and analytical approaches that are based on models used in economics, decision analysis, and game theory. However, unlike the pure forms of these theoretical models, Negotiation Analysis seeks to incorporate realistic assumptions about the way negotiations are actually conducted. For example, neither side is stipulated to act in accord with the precepts of game-theoretic rationality. Rather, both sides are expected to conduct themselves based on their subjective assessments of each other in the light of the usually imperfect information actually available to them. Sebenius (1991) characterizes this approach as "nonequilibrium game theory with bounded rationality and without common knowledge." An important aspect of Negotiation Analysis has been the application of various tools from decision analysis, including multi-attribute utility assessment to help parties prepare for negotiations (Raiffa, 1982, p. 133-165) . Negotiation Analysis seeks ways to "anticipate the likelihood of ex-post Pareto-inefficient agreements, in order to identify ways to help the parties to 'expand the pie"' (Sebenius, 1991, 2 l) .* Finally, Negotiation Analysis eschews the search for unique equilibria and solution concepts such as are found in cooperative game theory, and focuses instead on subjective perceptions of possible zones of agreement, with the objective of identifying agreements that are "among the best" available to the parties. In operational terms, Negotiation Analysis is used for developing methods to achieve "integrative" settlements by giving negotiators decision-analytic and other tools to help them articulate their own preferences clearly, and to help one or more parties to "match up" their preferences with those of other parties during the negotiation process.
Existing Negotiation Support Svstems: Many existing NSS have explicitly or implicitly relied on some of the concepts of Negotiation Analysis as a basis for their design. Several of these systems are summarized in Jelassi and Faroughi (1989) . NSS may be classified as follows: 1) Preparation and evaluation systems that operate away from the bargaining table to help * An efficient agreement may be conceptualized in terms of the framework of cooperative game theory, as proposed by Nash (1950) . The Nash model reckons payoffs from potential settlements of a negotiation in terms of the utilities of each potential settlement to each party. If mixed strategies (random strategies) are allowed, then the Nash model proposes a normative settlement, called the Nash bargaining solution, that satisfies several appealing criteria including Pareto efficiency. However, the Nash model falls short as a description of real negotiations. In particular, the use of mixed strategies is rarely observed in negotiations, possibly because the performance of a real-world negotiator is evaluated in terms of the utility associated with the actual settlement realized, rather than on the strategic desirability of a mixed strategy (Lute and RaiEa 1957) . Real world negotiations are often conducted using pure strategies, i.e., in issue space rather than in utility space. If the negotiation involves only one issue, then the settlement reached using pure strategies will generally be Pareto efficient, but this need not be the case when the negotiation involves multiple issues. individuals privately organize information, develop preference representations, refine prenegotiation strategies, or evaluate mid-negotiation offers, and 2) Process support systems that operate at or in lieu of a bargaining table. These systems restructure the dynamics and procedures of the negotiation process in order to make salient the possible gains from integrative bargaining (Thiessen and Loucks, 1992) . Thus, process support systems are designed not only to assist parties in gaining a subjective representation of the negotiation situation, but also to help negotiators to move toward more integrative settlements.
Examples of preparation systems include NEGOPLAN (Kersten et al. 1988) , NEGOTEX (Rangaswamy et al. 1989) , GMCR (Fang et al. 1993) . In addition to these formal preparation systems, generic decision analysis and spreadsheet software packages are also used in preparing for both negotiation and mediation (Nagel and Mills, 1990) . Process support systems may be further subdivided into two types: mediation systems and interactive bargaining systems. In mediation systems, a computer model substitutes for or assists a human mediator to prompt the parties toward jointly optimal agreements. Communications among parties using a mediation system are filtered through the computer or human mediator, although the parties remain in control of the outcome. Interactive bargaining systems simultaneously support the negotiation processes of all the parties, and enable the parties to communicate directly with each other over computer networks. Interactive systems may also contain a function for computer-assisted mediation. Examples of process support systems include PERSUADER (Sycara 1987 (Sycara , 1991 and ICANS (Thiessen and Loucks 1992) and the proposed NA system. We make the following summary observations regarding NSS models and systems reported in the literature. First, among the existing systems, GMCR, ICANS and NA have more closely relied on the concepts of Negotiation Analysis. NA is closest to ICANS in this regard. However, NA differs in significant ways in its design and operation compared to its predecessors. In particular, NA is designed to be more of a facilitator, rather than a mediator. Further, it is a fully interactive system that allows negotiators to communicate directly with one another over computer networks. Second, NA uses design principles that are somewhat different from the approaches used in Group Decision Support Systems (GDSS). In particular, NA does not require the same high degree of collaborative environment that may be difficult to establish in real world negotiation settings. In this sense, NA is differentiated from systems such as PERSUADER, MEDIATOR (Jarke et al. 1987), DECISION CONFERENCING3 (Quinn, Rohrbough, and McGrath 1985) , and other GDSS such as those developed by Nunamaker et al. (1991) . For a review of the GDSS area, see Rao and Jarvenpaa (1991) . Evaluation of NSS: Few studies have systematically examined the impact of computerassisted negotiation preparation or computer-mediated communications during negotiation.
Although it is generally believed that prior preparation by the parties will enhance negotiation outcomes (e.g., Raiffa 1982, p. 11 g-122) , there is very little published in the academic literature that has explored the benefits and limitations of computer preparation tools (Lim and Benbasat 1993) . The only reported tests we could find were experiments to evaluate ICANS (Thiessen and Loucks, 1992) and NEGOTEX (Eliashberg et al. 1993 ).
There is some published research that has compared computer-mediated communication with face-to-face communication in group decision tasks. This literature suggests that computermediated communication has the following effects: 1) reduces the communication bandwidth, thereby resulting in fewer exchanges of information (Arunachalam and Dilla 1995) , although the proportion of task-related information exchanges are somewhat higher (Siegel et al. 1986 ) 2) increases anonymity, which could lead to less cooperative behavior (Wichman 1970, Arunachalam and Dilla 1995) and more uninhibited behavior (Siegel et al. 1986 ) and 3) could restrict spontaneous expression because of the need (perceived or actual) to take turns communicating.
Experimental evidence suggests that computer-mediated communication enhances outcomes in some interactive decision tasks, but diminishes outcomes in other tasks. Nunamaker 3 DECISION CONFERENCING is a prototype GDSS that can be applied in a negotiation context (Rae and Jarvenpaa, 199 1). The negotiating parties first separately develop a decision model with the help of a third party facilitator using decision-analytic techniques. After this, however, the parties communicate directly in identifying a mutually preferred settlement relying on "democratic protocols" and by using various techniques such as decision trees, expected utility maximization, and Pareto algorithms. et al. (199 1) provide evidence that computer-mediated groups tend to be efficient and effective in generating options for mutual gain. Siegel et al. (1986) show that in the context of risky choice, computer-mediated communication groups shifted further away from members' initial individual choices than group decisions which followed face-to-face discussions. Hiltz et al. (1986) conclude that the quality of decisions was equally good for these two modes of communication, but there was greater agreement on decisions among the group members in the face-to-face groups. Their experiments also suggest that while computerized conferences were rated as satisfactory, face-to-face meetings were consistently rated as more satisfactory, especially on items related to ability to reach consensus.
A couple of studies have more directly examined the role of communication in influencing outcomes in negotiations. In the context of a single-issue negotiation with asymmetric information, Valley et al. (1995, p. 13) provide evidence that face-to-face negotiations resulted in significantly more "mutually beneficial" outcomes than negotiations where the parties used written offers and messages that were transmitted by messengers (simulating an e-mail facility). In the context of a multiple-issue negotiation, Arunachalam and Dilla (1995) also report that as compared to the use of an e-mail messaging system, face-to-face negotiation leads to higher individual and group profits. This is the only study that we are aware of that has examined outcomes associated with computer-mediated communication in a context where the proposed NA is likely to be useful.
In summary, past studies have only provided modest and inconsistent insights for assessing the impact that systems such as NA will have on the process and outcomes of negotiations. In this study, we attempt to isolate the effects of computer-assisted preparation and computerfacilitated communication in the context of a multiple-issue, integrative bargaining problem.
III. "NEGOTIATION ASSISTANT": DESIGN AND OPERATION
In this Section, we first describe the design criteria for the NA system, and relate these criteria to the appropriate concepts described in the previous section. Next, we provide a description of the operation of the system.
Design criteria
Moving: toward Pareto-efficiencv: The NA system is designed to foster more efficient outcomes by lessening the impact of factors that hinder the realization of integrative outcomes, which are more likely to occur when the parties are able to identify differences regarding their priorities, resources, risk preferences, and utilities (Pruitt 198 1). Trading on these differences represents a rich source of value to be mined in a negotiation situation (Raiffa, 1982, p . 13 1; Lax and Sebenius, 1986) . However, it is sometimes difficult to identify and optimally trade on these differences because 1) parties are not clear about their own priorities, 2) information about priorities and differences tends to be asymmetric; 3) optimal trades are sometimes "lost" in the complex communication pattern that characterizes a negotiation with many issues; 4) most negotiation situations present the potential for strategic behavior and parties sometimes mislead others regarding their preferences and priorities, 5) human emotions often interfere with rational judgment, and 6) a bias toward "fair" solutions sometimes leads negotiators to exhibit what we call "compromise bias," i.e., parties prefer to find some compromise position between the parties' initial demands on each separate issue rather than to explore tradeoffs between issues that might yield them higher individual and joint gains. This is similar to the notion of the "fixed-pie" bias referred to by Neale and Bazerman (199 1, p. 63 ).
NA's design addresses these barriers to integrative bargaining in the following ways. First, through the use of several utility assessment techniques, the system helps the parties to disaggregate their own preferences and priorities in order to better understand them. Preference assessment is based on a combination of simple additive utility functions recommended by Keeney and Raiffa (1991) and conjoint analysis techniques that have found wide application in areas such as Psychology and Marketing Research (Green and Srinivasan, 1978; Green and Krieger, 1993) .
These procedures enable users to develop a more precise gradation of their preferences by assessing issues both "one at a time" and as "part of a package." At every stage of utility assessment, users are given maximum flexibility to edit their inputs, and to internalize insights that are gained as a result of reflection on the bargaining set. By disaggregating preferences, we expect that the parties are more likely to identify and trade on differences between their priorities (Keeney and Raiffa 1991) .
Second, the system uses a de-personalized computer network environment through which parties negotiate. Further, the system provides both parties with real-time, subjective evaluations of the value of offers and counteroffers as they are made. These aspects engender a "problemsolving" orientation that make salient the "rational" settlement points (Pruitt 198 1).
Finally, by providing a "post-settlement" option, the system helps parties identity potential Pareto-superior settlements, where at least one party is strictly better off, and neither party is worse off. In this way, NA provides a technique for minimizing "value left on the table" after the parties have reached a settlement (Raiffa 1985) .
Maximize confidentialitv and minimize potential for "gaming;" the svstem: Another important design objective of NA is to protect absolutely the confidentiality of each side's subjective preferences until such time as both sides have agreed to a deal and both sides agree to examine options that may improve the deal they have concluded. At no time are the inputs of one party revealed to the other except as that party may choose voluntarily to share such information with her counterpart, just as she might in a conventional interaction.
Operation
NA utilizes a multi-stage process that enables negotiators to prepare for, execute, and evaluate negotiated solutions over a computer network. The inputs provided by users in the preparation stages may be edited and revised as often as needed as negotiations progress. Figure   1 summarizes the overall structure of the system, which consists of three main functions: preparation, structured negotiation, and post-settlement evaluation. Figure 2 provides a more detailed description of the operation by using example screens fi-om the system. Following Keeney and Raiffa (Keeney and Raiffa, 199 1, p. 132) , the current version of the system employs the restrictive assumption that "all inventing and creating of issues has occurred," and that the parties are ready to negotiate over the identified issues. While this is a significant limitation to the practical application of our system, it does, however, allow us to more precisely test the potential value of the system to enhance integrative bargaining.
In Stage II, called "Prepare," NA uses an additive "self-explicated" scoring model to elicit information from the user regarding 1) the relative preferences among issues, and 2) the relative preferences among the options possible for each issue (Screens 4 and 5, Figure 2 ). The users are first requested to distribute 100 points across all the issues; the users then indicate how many out of the points available for each issue they would award themselves for obtaining each option within that issue. NA requires that the most preferred option for an issue be assigned all the points associated with that issue and the least preferred option be assigned zero, and other options awarded some number of points between these two extremes (with ties getting equal numbers of points).4
Using the scores from Stage II, NA constructs in Stage III, called "Ratings," a set of sample settlement packages that include one option from every issue in play (Screen 6, Figure 2 ). The set of packages presented is selected automatically using conjoint analysis to form an orthogonal array. The use of an orthogonal array enables the computer to generate utilities for each issue and for each option within each issue independently of other issues and options.5 The selected set of packages is arranged in descending order of preference based on the scores provided in Stage II, but the scores themselves are not displayed in order to give users a "fresh look" at the consequences of their prioritization in Stage II! The user is then asked to rate each package on a scale of 0 to 100 to indicate the value that package would have if it were to become the final settlement.
Conjoint analysis is used in selecting all but a maximum of two of the packages to be rated. These two packages "frame" the conjoint set. The top package is one which yields the highest Stage II score for the user (i.e., it gives the user his or her most preferred options on each of the issues) and must be rated at 100 points. The bottom package is one which yields the lowest score (i.e., it gives the user his or her least preferred options on each of the issues) and must be rated at 0 points. Between these two extremes are displayed the orthogonal packages which may be rated in any manner the user desires. The ratings task gives the user the opportunity to contemplate options in the context of an overall agreement covering all issues simultaneously. It requires the user, in essence, to confront many of the tradeoffs implicit in the negotiation. NA permits the user to continuously reorder the presentation of the packages from most to least preferred as the user performs the ratings task.
When the ratings stage is completed, the utility weights, uij, for the ith issue and the jth option of that issue are computed automatically using the following dummy variable regression
The conjoint analysis feature is a significant departure from multi-attribute preference elicitation procedures (where used) in previous NSS systems. ICANS and MEDIATOR use formal mechanisms for preference elicitation. However, the packages presented by these systems are not orthogonal, and hence, the resulting utility measurements do not necessarily provide a reliable additive model of preferences. If the set of packages depart considerably from orthogonality, the parameters of the estimated additive utility functions can be unstable, and not valuable for the purposes of identifying efficient settlements.
6 The Prepare stage is technically referred to as the self-explicated, or the "compositional" method of preference elicitation (Srinivasan and Wyner, 1989; Green and Krieger, 1993) . In contrast, conjoint analysis is a "decompositional technique" in which overall preference scores are decomposed into the utility values attached to each issue and levels within issues. In early trials of the system, we only had the "Ratings" stage where the profiles were presented in some random order. However, the respondents found this task to be very difficult because of their inability to find appropriate anchors to facilitate the rating process. It is in view of this, that we added the "Prepare showing the relative weights of each issue and, within issues, of each option (rounded to the nearest integer). The graphs are also scaled between 0 and 100. In essence, users now observe graphically how their issue-by-issue and option-by-option priorities are affected by the exercise of trading these items off against one another in proposed final packages. It is not uncommon for users to feel somewhat dissatisfied with the%alues reflected in the graphs, and NA permits users to manipulate the graph bars directly using cursor keys to further refine their preferences.
Stage V, called "Negotiate," takes place after the computer has received Stage IV graphic inputs from both parties to the transaction (Screens 9, 10, 11 and 12, Figure 2 ). In essence, the system provides an electronic bargaining table on which negotiations take place. Offers, counteroffers, and written messages can be sent and received over the network. All offers are agree, the set of Pareto-superior packages are then revealed to the negotiators in order of their respective desirability to each party. Once-again, with consent of both parties, the negotiators ' In electronic markets, intermediaries are emerging to ensure the security and integrity of the system, and enforce all the rules agreed to by parties.
* The Pareto-superior packages displayed to the users are automatically scored according to their own preference functions. However, the revelation of these packages only provides ordinal information about the other party's preferences, i.e., it reveals whether a settlement is equal to or superior to the agreed settlement without disclosing the degree of superiority. An alternative display format would indicate only that Pareto-superior packages exist without disclosing the packages themselves. This is the approach adopted in the design of the ONDINE II system (Nyhart and Samarasan, 1989) . Additional criteria such as "equitability" of each superior package may be used to trim the number of packages displayed. may elect to continue the negotiations in hopes of reaching an agreement on one of the packages suggested by NA. If no such agreement can be reached, the parties revert back to their original, "Pareto-inferior" deal.
Stage VI can be repeated as often as NA is able to identify at least one package that makes one party better off without making the other party worse off. When a final deal has been struck, either with or without the help of the "Post-Settlement" stage, the parties are congratulated on reaching an agreement and they can then exit the system. NA then creates and stores files recording their inputs, negotiation exchanges, and post-settlements.g
IV. EXPERIMENT AND RESULTS

Hvootheses
To test the efficacy of the NA system, we designed a laboratory experiment using a simulated two-party, multi-issue sales transaction. In designing our experiment, we sought to answer two overriding questions: 1) Would parties using NA achieve a higher proportion of efficient agreements as compared to negotiators using conventional face-to-face negotiations, or using an e-mail messaging system? 2) How do the three basic functions of NA, namely, preparation using utility assessment, structured negotiations, and post-settlement facilitation contribute to its overall impact on negotiation outcomes? More specifically, we hypothesized that parties using of NA would make more integrative trades as compared to parties not using NA, and we hypothesized that each function of NA would add incremental value by building on the part that precedes it. Thus, we propose the following formal hypotheses (see also Lim and Benbasat 1993) :
' This information is only stored in the local computer of the user. The users may choose not to record any of the exchanges, by selecting the appropriate option in the "Config" menu.
Hl:
H2:
H3:
H4:
Computer-based utility assessment prior to negotiation leads to more Pareto-efficient outcomes (i.e., subjects using the preparation function of NA (NAP) will make more integrative trades as compared to subjects who negotiate face-to-face or over an e-mail system).
The mere use of computers, without structured preparation and negotiation, will not lead to more efficient outcomes (i.e., subjects using e-mail for negotiation will achieve fewer integrative trades than those using NA).
Structured communication and post-settlement evaluation enhances achievement of Paretoefficient outcomes (i.e., subjects using NA only for preparation will achiever fewer integrative trades than subjects who use all functions of NA).
The post-settlement option in NA will provide measurable Pareto-improvements to agreements reached using only the preparation and structured communication features of NA.
The negotiation scenario
In the scenario presented for the negotiation, the subjects were instructed to act as agents for their respective companies. The information specified that, after a preliminary round of discussions, four issues remained to be resolved between the parties for the transaction to go through: price, delivery date, type of currency to be used, and forum for dispute resolution should contractual disputes arise. A range of options was stipulated for each issue, and the buyers' and sellers' separate instructions revealed the relative importance of each issue and option to them. Table 1 summarizes the induced preference structures for the two roles." Due to a shortage of hard currency, the Hungarian buyer for East Europa Medical Group gave the highest priority to the type of currency to be used and preferred Hungarian currency to all other options. In contrast lo Only ordinal preferences were induced. The subjects internalized these preferences in their own idiosyncratic manner. This approach enabled us to minimize preference variability between subjects, while at the same allowing subjects in the computer condition to use the preference assessment procedures to better understand their preferences. In real negotiations, subjects are not as clear about the priorities, and may benefit more by using the NA system to understand their preferences. Thus, the experimental procedure is likely to understate any realized benefits of the system. Table 1 here --_---_-------_-currency was the U.S. seller's (Healthcare, Inc.) least important issue. The U.S. party valued a delayed delivery date of 14 months over all other items because of a shortage of inventory. The
________________
Hungarian buyer, on the other hand, rated delivery as third in importance, just above its fourthrated dispute resolution issue. Both parties rated price second in priority and both could close a transaction at any of the four price options listed in their instructions. The U.S. seller valued the dispute resolution forum third, just above the least important currency issue. There was thus a clear, mutually advantageous tradeoff to be made between the parties if the buyer obtained Hungarian currency (the buyer's first choice on its highest ranked priority --and the seller's least important issue) in exchange for an agreement to delay delivery to 14 months (the seller's first choice on its highest ranked priority --and the buyer's third ranked issue), assuming some acceptable agreement could be achieved on the issues of price and dispute forum.
Experimental setup
First-year MBA students at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania were recruited to participate in this study during their orientation week. Groups of MBA students were randomly assigned to one of four negotiation conditions: 1) Face-to-face (FF), 2) E-Mail messaging system (EML)," 3) NA system used for preparation, but followed by a face-to-face negotiation (NAP), and 4) NA system used:for both preparation and for structured communication (NAA). Two hundred and seventy students participated in our experiments.12 In each experimental condition, subjects were randomly assigned to the roles of buyer and seller.
I' A Windows-based E-mail system was designed specifically for our experiment. In addition to allowing parties to send messages of unlimited size to each other, the system allowed the parties to conveniently review past messages sent and received. Because E-mail systems have become commonplace, we are not describing our system in any detail here in order to conserve space. '* The experiments involving the computer conditions were conducted in August 1995, except for 4 dyads completed in September 1994. The face-to-face negotiations took place in September 1993. In addition, over 150 MBA students and over 20 executives at the same school participated in the development and testing of the system.
In the face-to-face condition, subjects met in pairs in supervised classrooms, were given the negotiation simulation to read and study, and were then permitted to freely negotiate with each other for as long as it took them to reach an agreement. The pairs preparing and/or negotiating over the computer network met in supervised computer laboratories, were given both the scenario and the appropriate instructions on the use of NA or the E-Mail systems. Those negotiating over the network were not allowed to speak with each other face-to-face. Those in the NAP condition first prepared for the negotiation without knowing who their partner would be. After their preparation was complete, they were introduced to their partner for the face-to-face encounter.
No time restrictions were placed on subjects in any experimental condition with respect to either preparation or negotiation.
To give the subjects a tangible incentive to bargain towards the goals stated in their respective role instructions, subjects were further informed that nondivisible individual prizes worth at least $100 would be awarded to the buyer and seller in each experimental condition who best fulfilled their respective management's priorities. l3 After reviewing and studying the case (and, for those in the NAP and NAA groups, preparing to negotiate using Stages I, II, and III of NA), but before actually negotiating, we asked all subjects to record the time spent preparing and to answer several questions. Among these were queries regarding the subjects' "realistic" expectations about what a final agreement would look like. The subjects filled out a second questionnaire when they concluded the negotiation indicating the terms of their final agreement, their perceptions regarding the negotiationprocess, their affirmation that they bargained in good faith and did not collude to split the prize and, for those in NAP, NAA, or EML conditions, their perceptions regarding the system. The questionnaires used in the study were designed not only to provide us data for testing the formal hypotheses, but to also provide other information to help us I3 To minimize chances of collusion in the face of this monetary incentive, we emphasized that the subjects would be required to sign a statement after completing the negotiation that they did not collude to obtain any part of the prize. In the context of the Wharton School's Code of Academic Integrity, we expect this signature to be a significant deterrent to bad faith conduct. In addition, as noted above, all negotiations took place in facilities where subjects were under observation throughout.
characterize the subjects' overall experiences under the different negotiation conditions. l4
Results Pre-Negotiation Results. As expected, there were few significant initial differences between the groups in the four experimental conditions, except for a slightly higher average age in the FF condition. See Table 2 . The FF group consisted of entering MBA students in an earlier year. All groups reported occasional participation in actual negotiations during the past year, and about two-thirds of the subjects in each condition were male, reflecting the gender composition of MBA programs.
A more important difference between the groups is that subjects using NA spent more than twice the time in preparing for the negotiation than subjects in the FF and EML groups. This difference between the groups is attributable to the fact that groups using NA had to master the operation of the system prior to negotiating. This required them to read through a 12-page manual, and to go through the system's pre-negotiation Stages I, II, and III outlined above.
Further, those in the NAP condition also had to print out the graphs of their preferences to take with them to the subsequent face-to-face negotiation. While this difference in preparation time could arguably explain some of our results, it is important to remember that increased preparation time is a direct consequence of a variable being manipulated in this study, namely, the use of the NA system to prepare for the negotiation.
Pre-negotiation aspirations: It appears that subjects using NA had somewhat more integrative "a priori realistic expectations" regarding their priorities. For example, a higher proportion of subjects expect Hungarian currency and 14 month delivery, than subjects in the EML and FF conditions. These differences between the groups are intriguing and, we believe, reflect the subjects' use of NA's preparation stages to better understand and internalize their own preferences. The buyers in the NA groups had a higher expectation of Hungarian currency at I4 A copy of the experimental materials may be obtained by writing to the authors. In the interest of space, we do not report the anayses we have done on the post-negotiation questionnaires. people who understand their bargaining positions more clearly may be more likely to form expectations that they can achieve their higher priorities and positions. In the concluding part of this section, we explore the extent to which these aspirations influence the outcomes observed in the negotiations.
__________________ Table 2 here _-----_-----_-_--_ Post-Negotiation Results There were several significant differences in outcomes achieved by the four groups. Most importantly, parties using NA for preparation (i.e., those in the NAP condition) executed a higher number of integrative trades than those who did not use NA, providing strong support for Hl. For example, Table 3 highlights the most frequent settlements for the issues "Currency" and "Delivery." Recall that our scenario "embedded" an integrative tradeoff between these two issues that called for the seller to achieve a 14 month delivery term and the buyer to achieve Hungarian currency. 12 of the 34 pairs in NAP achieved this integrative settlement -suggesting capitulation by both sides on lower-rated issues in order to obtain the best options on their highest-rated issue. Only 4 of 34 pairs in FF , and 4 of 33 pairs in the EML conditions made this trade. To assess the statistical validity of these differences in outcomes, we conducted a Pearson x2 test of independence. That is, we tested the null hypothesis that outcomes reached under FF, EML, and the NAP are independent of the negotiation condition. l6
This is rejected at a significance level less than 0.023 (x'(3) = 9.58). (For conducting this test, we I5 Note that not all respondents provided answers to this question. This accounts for the variations in sample size used for these statistics. I6 In conducting the following x2 tests, we collapse the no agreement outcomes under the "other" category, except when directly comparing outcomes of EML and NAA. This does not materially affect the results reported.
combined the results of FF and EML conditions because outcomes under these two conditions are not significantly different from each other (x"(3) = 1.54)). Table 3 here ------____----_-The EML outcomes are inferior to the outcomes from the NAA condition at a significance level less than 0.009 (x*(3) = 11.57), providing strong support for H2. An interesting outcome in the EML condition is that 3 pairs did not reach any agreement, when in fact the scenario included only options that provided gains from trade for both parties. This, combined with the inability of 2 pairs in the NAA condition to reach an agreement, suggests that computer-based communication leads to very poor outcomes for some parties who are not able to effectively handle an impersonal mode of communication, and behave in a more noncooperative manner (Wichern 1970; Arunachalam and Dilla 1995) . Thus, the use of systems such as NA may in fact make disagreement outcomes more likely to occur in negotiation contexts with little integrative potential. This raises interesting research issues for further evaluation of NSS.
__________-_____
Although outcomes in the NAA condition (after post-settlement) appear to be more integrative than outcomes in the NAP condition (17 versus 12 out of 34 pairs settling on Hungarian -14 months), the overall differences in outcomes are not statistically significant given our small samples. However, by partitioning the &i-square value to test for independence between components (Agresti 1990, p. 50) , there is a marginally significant difference (p < 0.065) between NAP and NAA with regard to achieving Hungarian-14 month versus Hungarian-12 month outcomes (x2( 1) = 3.41). It is also important to note that the number of incremental dyads (5) that reached integrative trades in NAA is more than the entire set of dyads that reached integrative agreements in the FF and EML conditions (4 each).
To analyze the outcomes between the NAP and NAA conditions more fully, it is useful to examine the preference structure of the two parties summarized in Table 1 , and the distribution of outcomes on each option of each issue, as summarized in Table 4 . The preferences in Table 1 suggest that integrative solutions are characterized by East Europa giving up on delivery (3rd important issue for EE and most important issue for HC) to gain on currency (most important issue for EE, but least important issue for HC). In addition to this "major trade," there is a "minor trade" that could enhance the efficiency of outcomes. The parties could trade on Dispute (least important for EE, but 3rd most important for HC), where EE can give up on Dispute options in exchange for concessions from HC on other issues. This suggests that in efficient settlements, we should see Dispute settlements more favorable to HC (more London and US Courts). The outcomes in the NAA and NAP conditions seem to support this in a directional sense. These results suggest that NA's structured communication process and post-settlement support provide only secondary benefits compared with the value added by NA's preparation function. However, as the efficiency of relatively minor trades become more important (e.g., when the number of issues increase), these secondary benefits could become very significant. In summary, we only found directional support for hypothesis H3, a surprise given our expectations for the impact of "electronic bargaining tables." Hypothesis H4 regarding the post-settlement feature of NA was not supported. Eighteen of the 32 pairs reaching an agreement in the NAA condition settled on a final agreement without utilizing the "post-settlement" feature (i.e. their agreement was already Pareto-efficient given their inputs). The remaining 14 pairs accessed the "post-settlement" feature and examined packages that were Pareto-superior to their initial settlement, based on their pre-negotiation inputs. Of these 14 pairs, only 6 chose to re-initiate the negotiation, and 5 of these pairs reached a settlement different fi-om the one they had initially agreed to. Of these 5 pairs, 3 pairs moved from their initial settlement to a Pareto-superior one that incorporated the "imbedded" tradeoff between Hungarian currency and a 14 month delivery term. Thus, the "post-settlement" feature did prompt some parties to examine and capture additional joint gains from the negotiation, but more than half of those who accessed the "post-settlement" feature did not utilize it. Subjects' responses to open-ended questions and debriefings suggest several possible explanations for this result. First, some subjects reported that re-opening the negotiation after reaching an agreement revived uncomfortable, distributive aspects of the bargaining that they preferred not to reexperience. Second, some subjects experienced subtle changes in preferences as a result of interactions that took place during the negotiation. Their "post-settlement" preferences thus diverged both from those stated in the scenario and from their own pre-negotiation "scoring" inputs, rendering the suggested post-settlement options unattractive. Finally, in combination with the factors listed above, subjects simply found the "post-settlement" feature awkward to use as designed. These results suggest that we should re-think the design, of the post-settlement feature for NA.
Aspiration levels and post-negotiation outcomes: To explore how NA influences outcomes, it is instructive to first select for analysis dyads in which either the buyer aspired for Hungarian currency or the seller aspired for 14 month delivery. Of 30 such dyads (out of a total of 67) in the combined FF and EML conditions, only 2 dyads achieved the integrative trade with Hungarian-14 month outcome, while 13 achieved the next best outcome, namely, Hungarian-12 months. In contrast, in the NAP condition, there were 19 dyads (out of a total of 34) with at least one party having high aspirations and 9 of them achieved the integrative trade, and a further 5 pairs achieved the Hungarian-12 month outcome. Of further interest is that in the NAA condition, there were 20 dyads (out of a total of 34) with high aspirations, and 14 achieved the integrative trade, while 1 dyad achieved the second best Hungarian-12 month outcome. These results, in conjunction with the overall outcomes summarized in Table 3 , suggest that when the parties have high aspirations, integrative trades are morelikely to occur, and this likelihood is enhanced greatly by the use of the NA system. Earlier, we noted that the preparation function of NA also helps establish higher aspirations prior to negotiation.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The experimental test provides support for the hypothesis that the use of the NA system developed from our research is likely to help negotiators achieve Pareto-superior results in certain structured multi-issue negotiations. The fact that negotiators using our system made more integrative trades than those who negotiated an identical scenario face-to-face or using an e-mail system suggests that NA system played a key role in helping parties to overcome some of the barriers to integrative bargaining that afflict conventional negotiations. The equivalence in outcomes (in terms of integrative trades) between subjects using the e-mail system and those negotiating face-to-face suggests that the mere use of computer technology will not improve negotiation outcomes. The key to achieving integrative trades is to set and maintain high aspirations in conjunction with a problem-solving orientation (Pruitt and Lewis 1977, p. 18 1) .
High expectations provide the motivation to keep looking for integrative trades without settling for compromise solutions, while the problem solving orientation provides the approach for identifying alternative proposals to offer to the other party that still maintain high potential benefit for self Thus, the value of NA derives from helping negotiators to prepare for the negotiation, and this value is preserved and enhanced if the e-mail method of communication is structured to make the preparation inputs salient during the negotiation. Our results demonstrate that NA serves as an operational mechanism to implement Negotiation Analysis to facilitate integrative bargaining.
These results are encouraging in the experimental setting we designed, and we expect that the preparation feature of NA would be useful in real-world setting as well. However, further enhancements would be required before a full-blown "electronic bargaining table" can be deployed across computer networks. First, the subjects in our test began with a fully specified set of issues and options. In fact, in conjoint analysis, a basic assumption is that all options of every issue are in the "acceptable range" (Srinivasan and Wyner, 1989) . Real world negotiations are not so well structured. To remedy this shortcoming, the system must be expanded to include an "Agenda setting" stage prior to the current "Issues" stage.
A second, more general limitation of the tested version of the NA involves its utility assessment procedures. The methods of multi-attribute utility analysis do not easily model the various interactions among issues that sometimes take place in complex bargaining situations. For example, some interactions significantly alter the value of an issue under special, specified assumptions, thus requiring the system to present models that list the issue as having a very high value under one set of assumptions and a much lower value under others. Such problems are imbedded in the use of multi-attribute utility analysis and are subject to solutions as Negotiation Analysis develops improved models for representing preference interactions.
A third limitation of the system, discussed with respect to H4, involves the post-settlement stage. As now configured, this stage may leave the parties vulnerable to pure distributional bargaining between Pareto-superior packages, especially if there are only two such packages.
This could injure a relationship that, prior to the post-settlement stage, was in good working order. One solution to this problem is to simply ask the parties, prior to the beginning of the negotiation, to agree to an objective criteria for selecting an optimal post-settlement using criteria such as those suggested by Keeney and Raiffa (1991) . The efficacy of alternative methods of post-settlement support have to be evaluated in future research, especially in view of the possibility of the users "gaming" the system. These limitations are significant. For the moment, however, the value ofNEGOTIATION ASSISTANT has been demonstrated in our experimental setting, and in our classrooms, where we use NA to teach students in a tangible way the structure of integrative tradeoffs and the value of analytical approaches to facilitate negotiations. The system has been used successfully in an educational setting for several years at a few leading MBA programs to demonstrate principles of utility assessment, integrative tradeoffs, Pareto-optimality, and other concepts of Negotiation Analysis. i NA also presents new research opportunities. For example, it might be used to help investigate paths toward integrative settlements. Mumpower (199 1) has provided some initial insights into preference structures which facilitate "horse-trading." Because the system can keep track of the history of offers, counteroffers, and messages, this allows for investigating patterns that lead to integrative bargaining solutions. Another opportunity for future research is the comparative testing of the NA process against competing processes such as those used in ICANS, or even simple training programs focusing on integrative bargaining, to isolate the relative merits of each of these approaches in situations where all of them can be deployed. 
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Note: In screens 9 to 12, issues are arranged in order of importance based on the utility tinction provided by the user. r' These include the perceptions of both buyers and sellers and may be informally interpreted as the forecast of settlements reached based solely on ex-ante perceptions, not modified by the negotiation process. Notes: Numbers in parenthesis under the computer condition are outcomes before the post-settlement option was initiated. 
